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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. MURRAY 
Defendant/Appellant 
: Case No. 970110-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that 
killing a domestic animal without cause or need constitutes 
mistreatment? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that 
killing a domestic animal without cause or need is unreasonable 
or inhumane (where the actor used an unfamiliar weapon; the actor 
lacked focus in using the weapon/ and the act was committed in a 
residential area, in the presence of neighbors)? 
There are two applicable standards of review. The first is 
applied to factual findings and the other to conclusions of law. 
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As to factual determinations, the standard of review is one of 
clear error. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). 
Conclusions of law, on the other hand are reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Provo City Code § 8.02.030(1)and(2). Cruelty to Animals 
Prohibited. 
The following are unlawful: 
(1) To maim, disfigure, torture, beat, mutilate, burn 
or scald, or otherwise mistreat any animal. 
(2) To destroy any domestic animal except in a 
reasonable and humane manner. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Robert L. Murray was arrested September 1,1995, 
and charged with Cruelty to Animals in violation of Provo City 
Code §8.02.030, Provo City Code, a Class B misdemeanor. On 
November 22, 1996, a bench trial before the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard resulted in Defendant's conviction. Defendant was 
sentenced on February 6, 1997. On February 20, 1997, Defendant 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court, 
commencing this action. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On September 1, 1995, at approximately 1:00 p.m. a Provo 
City police officer was dispatched to Defendant's residence on a 
report of shots fired (Tr. at 57-58). At the scene, officers 
discovered a shotgun, shells, and a small, sandy-colored cocker 
spaniel which had been shot to death (Tr. at 61-67). A 
responding officer described the puppy as having a partially 
severed left front paw, as well as severe head and chest wounds 
(Tr. at 67). 
According to neighbors, a shot was fired, followed by the 
sound of a puppy crying or yelping (Tr. at 17, 37). Neighbors 
then looked in Defendant's back yard and saw the wounded animal 
(Tr. at 37). Upon failing to successfully kill the dog with his 
initial shot, Defendant set the shotgun down and returned to his 
apartment for new ammunition (Tr. at 118). Approximately fifty 
seconds later, the dog's yelping was silenced by a second shot 
(Tr. at 18) . 
Other facts relevant to Defendant's conviction for cruelty 
to animals are efficiently stated in Judge Howard's findings of 
fact: 
1. The dog in question was not ill, or sick, or 
suffering from any debilitating problem. 
2. The evidence is undisputed in terms of what 
factually occurred. The offense occurred on September 
1,1995 in Provo City, within city limits. The 
defendant, Robert L. Murray, did shoot the firearm two 
times, which shooting is confirmed by his own 
testimony. The firearm that was discharged was a 12-
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gauge shotgun, and the defendant shot it with the 
intention of killing his dog. 
3. This conduct understandably caused some alarm 
and fear and concern to defendant's neighbors. 
4. The evidence, which is uncontroverted, shows 
that the defendant intended to use the shotgun to kill 
the dog. 
5. The defendant was suffering in this 
particular instance from some emotional frustration, 
despondency, worry, or stress, but he was not under 
some diminished capacity which would impair ability to 
formulate the intent to kill the animal. 
6. The defendant's anxiety was not such that it 
would mar his ability to exercise rational thought or 
impair his ability to formulate intent, which in this 
case was the intent to dispatch the dog. 
7. There is no evidence that shows that 
defendant by nature or habit was cruel to or would 
mistreat animals, either the particular animal in 
question in this case or other dogs. 
8. The defendant's action in this case was 
deliberate, it was conceived, it was voiced to a 
neighbor. The defendant did not have the specific 
intent by use of the shotgun to actually torture or 
shoot the animal with the intent of maiming it. The 
defendant failed to kill the dog which he intended to 
do, probably with one blast from the shotgun, and 
simply botched the job, based on his lack of focus or 
his distressed state. 
9. Notwithstanding the foregoing finding, the 
ordinance provides that an individual may destroy a 
domestic animal, which this dog was, in a reasonable 
and human manner. Destroying an animal inhumanely 
violates the ordinance. The law protecting animals 
from mistreatment does not allow for a person to kill 
an animal without cause or need even if the killing is 
swift and without suffering to the animal. Such an 
action is not humane because it violates the policy 
considered in light of all the circumstances. 
10. The killing of the dog in this case was 
without cause, even though the defendant had the design 
of doing so swiftly and without suffering by using a 
shotgun. Such was an inappropriate action, and 
constituted extreme mistreatment. 
(R. 50-52). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was convicted of Cruelty to animals in violation 
of Provo City Code § 8.02.030. Although Defendant attempts to 
pigeon-hole the entire basis of the conviction into §8.02.030(2), 
the trial judge made clear that the conviction was also based on 
§ 8.02.030(1). The willful actions of Defendant on September 1, 
1995, amply demonstrate mistreatment of an animal. Further, the 
manner in which Defendant destroyed the animal was both 
unreasonable and inhumane. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF CRUELTY TO 
ANIMALS 
A. Defendant failed to act in a reasonable or humane manner in 
killing his dog 
The gravamen of Defendant's appeal is based on a narrow 
interpretation of the term ^manner' as used in subsection two of 
Provo City Code 8.02.030. In fact, the trial judge made clear 
that the conviction was based on both subsection one and 
subsection two. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to begin with a 
statutory analysis of subsection two. 
Subsection two prohibits destroying "any domestic animal 
except in a reasonable and humane manner." Defendant claims that 
the term ^manner' should only apply to the intended method of 
killing the animal. However, even the definition of ^manner' 
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provided in Defendant's brief fails to support such a narrow 
interpretation: 
Webster's Dictionary defines "manner as it is 
applicable here as either "a characteristic or 
customary mode of acting" or "a mode of procedure or 
way of acting." Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Tenth Edition) at 708, (Defendant's Brief 
at 13). 
" :. he instant case, a xway of acting' ~~ A~ characteristic :r 
customary modp ' * p- —-, 7' . - ?,iv ---^  - -^r^ ?>- ansive Lhan sirr.lv 
oc:,, AiU. -:.. _: .oi;.ai ^n: iiumental 1 ty. T:. ,.o 
way aoes the p-ain .anguage of §8 . o; . 030-'7 require the Court to 
cdr.> * • ; - . : I L : . 
The t.: . a . :our~ :oun'i mat Defendant', "icticn^  were bcth 
unreasonable and inhumane ' " ~]-"-* • be 
argued that shooting an ariimai residential nei ghbornood is a 
reasonable *way ^f --*"ing'. ouv.ii action ib not only 
unitr-i.^-^ • .. dependent ly illegal ae an unauthorized 
discharge of a firearm within the City- ^ ' • " "- charge was 
b- > . jt . rearm. 
That charge, however, was dismissed oy 'udgi Howard oecause the 
crime occurred during tne ^ ir-• • ::i : i rri :i i Ia ] epi so« : I: Ie :::z i ieJ 1:;;y t: :> 
a n i m a l s v i o l a t i o n C° ^ c 
Many other factors also combine to render the Defendant's 
act J i i tJd&uiJdble Mid inhumane. To begin, the dog was in goo^ d 
healt; . Shooting such c :: . '5 -.either ~ -^-asonable nor humane 
vv\ • - Defendant asked 
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only "two or three people" if they would take care of it (Tr. at 
113) . Such de minimis placement efforts are certainly not 
reasonable or humane as a ^customary mode of acting' when killing 
a domestic animal. 
Further, Defendant chose to dispatch the animal with an 
unfamiliar, borrowed weapon (Tr. at 116, 117). Defendant also 
admitted that he ^wasn't focused' when he initially shot the 
animal, severing its paw (Tr. at 117) . These facts indicate the 
absence of a reasonable xmode of procedure.' Finally, Defendant 
shot the dog in the presence of neighbors. Naturally, this 
caused alarm and fright, as well as emotional distress in those 
who witnessed and heard the animal's suffering. 
While there are no recorded cases which mirror the facts of 
the instant matter, it is obvious that the needless killing of 
dogs is enjoined under an ordinance prohibiting cruelty to 
animals. Defendant's entire basis of appeal rests on the claim 
that subsection two (2) is exclusively concerned with an actor's 
choice of lethal instrumentality. Under Defendant's 
interpretation of the ordinance, a person would be perfectly 
within his rights to purchase the entirety of a pet store's 
livestock and summarily kill the same, so long as the banner or 
destruction' was relatively quick and painless. 
Clearly, by enacting an ordinance against cruelty to 
animals, the Provo City Council did not wish to create a legal 
7 
mechanism, for the needless slauaht^r of d.^-^-ir av iiuaio. ^^ ^ s 
axi omat i : ta 1:m 11 .. .- u c t e d in such 
a wa\ a.? L O avoid rendering provisions meaningless or absurd. 
Miiiett ,- ..„ „i. . .ili I'^ftO) . 
B. Defendant' b needless killing of his dog < : < >iis! i ti il es e x; I o: nm J 
mistreatment of an animal 
I - ' . .:
 t . -_ . ;ons n „ .osection 
two, " wa; bu* -ne :t i : •_ trial court' , r-^sonabie- bases for 
convic4-: ~- • • o 
grounder ..^  §6.02.0.: according t*' subsection ne it is 
unlawful x* i.t:jC/ maim, disfigure, torture, D^CLL, ~ ' 
scald, or otherwise mistreat any animal,f (emphasis daaed) . While 
Defendant'^ br^ef fails to even address the mistreatment b-ris 
c. -.died upon heavily by the court. 
Mistreatment can be defined as follows: "To handle or treat 
1
 - - " -^ Lvxx^ye tuition, ^ne American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language at 8 4 emphasis ad d e d ) . 
Defer, * - . • . i. 
Kil-Lxiig animals WJ Lr.cjt cause or need is deeply offensive to 
widely held societal values which place a nu 
ati^:.^ "nrh values, for example, exp.axn trie universal 
disgust experienced rv Ameriran^ as they reaa about the needless 
s,a^_. • ...... s past it woi il d be difficult 
to locate many citizens wr.c would now condone the action of train 
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passengers who used herds of buffalo for target practice, leaving 
the carcasses to rot on the Western plains. 
These same values lead parents of immature young children to 
discipline their youth for the indiscriminate killing of small 
animals such as birds, squirrels, and so on. The needless 
killing of animals is no less wrong because the individual 
intends the pain of such death to be minimal. At trial, Judge 
Howard stated the following: 
. . . I think it's probably — even Mr. Means 
[Defense Counsel], as he indicated — a general 
consensus that caring of animals in this fashion is 
such that it would raise public outrage (Tr. at 146). 
Appellee does not here attempt to suggest that animals enjoy 
an unqualified right to life. Rather, it is the right to kill 
animals which is regulated by Provo City Code in §8.002.030. 
Judge Howard stated the following: 
I don't believe that the law provides for a person 
to kill an animal without cause or need, even if swift 
and without suffering. Such an action is not humane, 
because it's violating the policy considered in light 
of all the circumstances. 
An illustration would be could a neighbor simply 
pick off his neighbor's dogs one by one, knowing that 
the dogs and animals would be killed swiftly and 
humanely and without suffering. I do not believe that 
is the intent of the law (Tr. at 149). 
"Statutory terms should be interpreted and applied according 
to their commonly accepted meaning." State v. Souza, 84 6 P.2d 
1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993). By using language such as 
^otherwise mistreat any animal', it is clear that the City 
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Council intended the ordinance :o prohibi* brr^- -'^ -ge of 
r.isrreatm-r-*-u jiees, that 
L._..:iU a:. ^ ... - .*.Ow*: i ajs^ 'ori5 i • tutes rx:reir.e 
mistreatmer1- , * f ' r- ~\e uiLimate ----.... . 
fc: '« jeiui.uai.; .- b r i e f o n l y '-.Ojec:^ *. • the trial c o u r t ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n if ?* v\n ~ - r V ^ 0 d e § 8 . 02 . C jo vi.y / D e f e n d a n t ' s 
c ' . - n n H p r P-r™ro r-j_-Hxr C o d e 
§ 8.C2.03C ne great weight of eviienc- presented at trial 
s > : ^ r - - • .
 :j in a 
reasonable ^h ; numane manner .n aestroyma r 15 acq. further, 
evidence presented at trial r " lm 
co:/ . .lion on the basis of miDiieaimeii:. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on m e fcregc:"-n arguments, AppeJ lee moves that 
D--^v -w ~ . to animals be upheld. 
j^ateci Mi i i / c\?\\ 11111 1 'ecenibt.'i , 1 
K/;,-. ,. 
Vernon F. (Rick) Re •:;:;£ 3 
Attorney fcr Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were delivered to Thomas Means and 
Margaret Lindsay, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, at Aldrich, 
Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo 
UT 84603-0200 this / day of December, 1997. 
Vernon F. (Rick) Ro; 
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